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Résumé
Nous analysons la relation entre la concurrence imparfaite et l’accumulation
du capital dans une économie duale, composée d’un secteur traditionnel et
d’un secteur moderne, et peuplée par deux types d’agents, des travailleurs
et des capitalistes. Les travailleurs allouent leur temps disponible entre les
deux secteurs productifs. Les capitalistes accumulent de la richesse dans le
secteur moderne. L’économie est ouverte aux mouvements de capitaux, mais
l’endettement des capitalistes est contraint. Le comportement non concur-
rentiel des capitalistes leur procure une rente supplémentaire, qui est obtenue
aux dépends des travailleurs et diminue l’emploi dans le secteur moderne.
A long terme, si l’endettement des capitalistes n’est pas contraint, la con-
currence imparfaite favorise l’accumulation de capital et la croissance, alors
qu’elle est néfaste dans le cas contraire. De plus, lorsque les capitalistes ne
sont pas contraints, l’emploi et les salaires sont plus élevés. Cette propriété
peut suggérer l’introduction d’une subvention des héritages, qui permet à
l’économie d’atteindre le régime sans contrainte d’endettement, et qui ac-
croît le bien-être des travailleurs.
JEL classification: D43, D9, D64.
Mots-clés : concurrence imparfaite, accumulation du capital, altruisme.
Abstract
We analyze the relationship between imperfect competition and capital
accumulation in a dual economy, with traditional and modern sectors and two
types of agents (workers and capitalists). Workers allocate their time endow-
ment between the two sectors. Capitalists accumulate wealth in the modern
sector. The economy is open to capital flows, but capitalists face borrowing
constraints. Non-competitive behavior of capitalists results in a rent which
is extracted from the workers and lowers employment in the modern sector.
In the long-run, if capitalists are unconstrained, imperfect competition is
beneficial for capital accumulation and growth, while it is detrimental in the
converse case. Moreover, not-binding borrowing constraints lead to higher
employment and wages. This can motivate the introduction of a subsidy on
bequests which allows the economy to reach the unconstrained regime, and
is welfare-enhancing for workers.
JEL classification: D43, D9, D64.
Keywords: imperfect competition, capital accumulation, altruism.
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1 Introduction
Does imperfect competition foster capital accumulation in a developing econ-
omy ? This paper is an attempt to answer this question. We explore the
relationship between imperfect competition and capital accumulation, in a
dual economy. Considering an economy with two sectors, a traditional agri-
cultural sector and a modern capitalistic one, we assume a non-competitive
behavior of capitalists in the modern sector. Capitalists take into account the
eﬀect of their labor demand on the equilibrium wage. This behavior results
in an extra rent for them, but introduces a distortion in factor prices. We
aim at evaluating its eﬀect on capital accumulation.
Since Lewis (1954) contribution (developed through a formal model in
Ranis and Fei (1961)), numerous articles have explored issues relating to the
migration of workers from a traditional sector to a modern one. Development
is viewed as an unbalanced growth process, in which labor shifts toward the
manufacturing sector. Capital accumulation in this sector increases labor
productivity and results in higher wages, attracting more and more workers.
The article by Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) can be viewed as a modern
reformulation of the argument, which deals with three sectors of activity
(agriculture, manufacturing and services), and shows how such models are
consistent with historical stylized facts.
As it is apparent in Lewis’ model, a direct consequence of the dual produc-
tion structure is that the two sectors have conflicting interests. Capitalists
in the modern sector can hire more workers at lower costs if the labor pro-
ductivity in the traditional sector is low enough. The mechanism would be
reinforced if the capitalists had a non-competitive behavior taking account of
the eﬀect of their decisions on the traditional sector. Worsening the situation
in the traditional sector by such a behavior could favor a quicker develop-
ment of the modern sector. Typically, by strategically reducing their labor
demand, capitalists can maintain lower wages.
In order to formulate this idea, we consider a framework that retains
the main ideas of Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961) models. We use
a model with successive generations of workers and capitalists. Workers
are identical within a generation and consume their whole revenue at each
period. Capitalists are altruistic and leave as a bequest a stock of wealth to
their descendants. Thus, our model is close to Mankiw (2000)’s model with
savers and non-savers agents.
We consider a dual economy with two production sectors, a traditional
agricultural sector and a modern capitalist one. The traditional sector em-
ploys labor as the only input, when the modern one uses capital and labor.
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Workers must allocate their time endowment between the two activities. The
optimal allocation of workers time determines labor supply for the modern
sector.
We assume that capitalists behave non-competitively. They maximize
their profit taking into account the impact of their labor demand on the
equilibrium wage. Under this assumption, they tend to demand less labor
than in the competitive case, in order to decrease the equilibrium wage.
The equilibrium concept is in the line of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium
(cf. Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993) and
Gabszewicz and Michel (1997)) : some agents, called strategic agents, take
into account the influence of their choice on the walrassian equilibrium and
play between them a game of the Cournot-Nash type. In our framework,
strategic agents are the capitalists, who consider the eﬀect of their labor
demand on the walrassian equilibrium wage.
The economy is small and open to capital flows and the international
interest rate is exogenous and constant. Capital markets are imperfect in
the sense that capitalists cannot borrow more than a given fraction of their
wealth. Such kind of borrowing limit can result from an enforcement problem,
as in Matsuyama (2000).
Whether borrowing constraints are binding or not will be crucial for the
consequences of imperfect competition. If the borrowing constraint is not
binding, capital return is determined by the international interest rate. Thus,
the non-competitive behavior of capitalists cannot aﬀect the marginal return
of capital, and the economy works as a small open economy. On the contrary,
if the borrowing constraint is binding, the total capital stock of each capi-
talist is proportional to his own wealth, and the economy works as a closed
economy. The capital return now is endogenous and depends on the capital-
labor ratio. Therefore, the non-competitive behavior of capitalists tends to
decrease the marginal return of capital as it leads to a smaller labor demand.
To sum up, in both cases, the non-competitive behavior of capitalists pro-
vides them an extra rent due to a lower wage. In the case of a non-binding
constraint, the marginal return of capital is not aﬀected. But in the case of
a binding constraint, the marginal return of capital decreases.
We study the long run equilibrium of this economy, and we analyze how
the non-competitive behavior of capitalists aﬀects capital accumulation. Two
long run growth rates can be define. One can be called the international
growth rate, driven by the international rate of return of capital. The other
one is the natural growth rate corresponding to the growth rate in the popu-
lation of workers. If the international growth rate is greater than the natural
one, the borrowing constraint is not binding in the long run. In this case, the
rentability of wealth is exogenously given by the international rate of return.
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Capitalists benefit from an extra rent induced by their non-competitive be-
havior and the marginal return of their wealth is not aﬀected. Therefore,
capitalists non-competitive behavior favors capital accumulation.
On the contrary, if the international growth rate is smaller than the nat-
ural one, the borrowing constraint is binding in the long run. Capitalists
benefit from an extra rent provided by their non-competitive behavior but
the marginal return of their wealth decreases. In this case, the economy
works as a closed economy. Capitalists non-competitive behavior leads to
smaller employment and capital stock in the modern sector. Thus, imperfect
competition involves very diﬀerent consequences on capital accumulation ac-
cording to the borrowing constraint is binding or not. Capital accumulation
is fostered in the unconstrained regime and is weaken in the constrained one.
Our work can be viewed as a contribution to the literature about in-
equality and economic growth, following Stiglitz (1969) and Bourguignon
(1981). If the saving function is convex, inequality is growth-enhancing. In
our model, savers are the capitalists and their non-competitive behavior that
impoverishes workers may have a positive or negative eﬀect on growth.
This paper is also related to an emerging literature that focuses on the
interaction between long-run capital accumulation and imperfect competi-
tion. Laitner (1982) is one of the first attempt to study the consequences on
long-run capital accumulation of the existence of oligopolies on commodity
market. More recently, Sorger (2002) assumes, in the Ramsey model, that
households exercise market power on the capital market: they take into ac-
count the impact of their own investment on the capital return. Still, Becker
(2003) uses the same framework and studies the existence of stationary equi-
libria in a two players game. In these two contributions, the strategic variable
is the investment in capital. Belan, Michel and Wigniolle (2002, 2004) have
introduced the Cournot-Walras equilibrium in a growth model to represent
the long-run eﬀect of pension funds.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the short run equilibrium,
for given levels of wealth for capitalists. It analyzes the impact of imperfect
competition on labor demand in the modern sector and on the marginal
return of wealth for capitalists. Section 4 considers the long run equilibrium
and the impact of non-competitive behavior on capital accumulation. Section
5 concludes. Section 6 is a final technical appendix.
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2 The model
Throughout the paper, we consider a small economy open to capital flows,
with an international constant gross interest rate R. In each period, popu-
lation is divided between workers and capitalists. The workers live for one
period and consume their income (non-savers in Mankiw (2000)). Capitalists
are altruistic dynasties à la Barro (1974) who consume, save and accumulate
wealth.
2.1 The workers
In each period, a new generation of identical workers is born and lives for
one period. The number of workers, Nt in period t, grows at rate n: Nt =
(1 + n)Nt−1, where the growth factor (1 + n) is less that R. Each worker
possesses a time endowment of one unit. He spends l units of time at work
in modern firms for a wage wt, and the remainder in the traditional activity
which provides him a revenue φ (1− l). Labor supply lt of a worker living in
period t maximizes
wtl + φ (1− l) , l ∈ [0, 1] (1)
where wt is the real wage. Alternatively (1) can be interpreted as a utility
function of consumption and leisure which is linear with respect to consump-
tion ct = wtlt.
We make the following assumption on φ.
Assumption 1. The function φ is three times continuously diﬀerentiable on
the interval (0, 1). It satisfies1
∀z ∈ (0, 1) , φ0 (z) > 0, φ00 (z) < 0 and φ000 (z) ≥ 0
limz−→0 φ
0 (z) = +∞
Individual labor supply lt satisfies φ0 (1− lt) = wt, if lt > 0. The total
labor supply is Lt = Ntlt. Let us define the inverse function of aggregate
labor supply
Wt (L) ≡ φ0
µ
1− L
Nt
¶
(2)
for 0 < L < Nt. Under assumption 1, this function is increasing from φ0 (1)
to +∞ and convex.2 These properties have two consequences. First, if
1The assumption φ000 ≥ 0 implies that the inverse function of aggregate labor supply is
convex.
2
W 0t (L) = − 1Ntφ
00
³
1− LNt
´
> 0
W 00t (L) =
1
N2t
φ000
³
1− LNt
´
≥ 0



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wt ≤ φ0 (1), labor supply is zero and home production is the only resource of
the economy. In order to hire some workers, firms must pay a wage higher
than φ0 (1) ≡ Wmin, that we call minimum wage in the following. Second,
whatever the actual wage is, people will spend part of their time endowment
in traditional production.
2.2 The capitalists
There are I dynasties of capitalists, I ≥ 1. In period t, capitalist i allocates
his wealth Xit between capital stock in the familial firm or investment on
capital markets. All the firms produce the same commodity with capital Kit
and labor Lit according to a constant-return-to-scale technology F (Kit, Lit)
which includes capital after depreciation. Marginal products are positive and
decreasing.
The international gross interest rate R applies for borrowing and lending.
Let Zit = Kit−Xit, the amount borrowed by family i in period t. A negative
Zit means that a fraction of family wealth is invested on international capital
markets. Capitalists face a borrowing limit in the sense that Zit must be less
than a fraction µ of the wealth of family i 3
Zit ≤ µXit, µ > 0. (3)
Capitalists have a Nash behavior on labor market. They make their deci-
sions in factor demands by taking into account the eﬀect of their own labor
demand on the equilibrium wage wt. At equilibrium of the labor market,
labor supply Lt is equal to the sum of labor demands Lit + L−it, where
L−it =
P
j 6=i Ljt is labor demand of other capitalists. From equation (2), real
wage paid by all firms is then wt =Wt (Lit + L−it). Thus, income of capitalist
i in period t writes
Πit = F (Xit + Zit, Lit)−RZit −Wt (Lit + L−it)Lit (4)
and is allocated between consumption Cit and savings
Πit = Cit +Xit+1 (5)
3This kind of borrowing limit can result, for instance, from the enforcement problem
(Matsuyama (2000)). Specifically, the capitalist would refuse to honour its payment oblig-
ation RZit if it is greater than the cost of default, which is taken to be a fraction of family
wealth λXit. Thus, the lender would allow the capitalist to borrow only up to µXit, with
µ = λ/R.
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Capitalist i behaves like an infinite-lived agent and maximizes the dis-
counted sum
∞X
t=0
γt
C
1− 1σ
it
1− 1σ
, 0 < γ < 1, σ > 0 (6)
subject to equations (3), (4) and (5), for a given initial wealth Xi0 and taking
labor demands of other capitalists (L−it)t≥0 as given. The discount factor γ
stands for the degree of altruism.
2.3 Intertemporal equilibrium
Given the initial wealth of capitalists, Xi0 (i = 1, . . . , I), an intertemporal
equilibrium consists of sequences of
• wages (wt)t≥0,
• decisions of capitalists (Lit, Zit, Cit, , Xit+1)t≥0, i = 1, . . . , I,
• decisions of workers (lt)t≥0,
• aggregate labor (Lt)t≥0,
which, in addition to all the individual optimality conditions, satisfy the
equilibrium conditions
Lt = Ntlt =
IX
i=1
Lit, and wt =Wt (Lt) .
2.4 The competitive economy without restriction on
borrowing
We first study the benchmark case of an economy where capitalists have a
competitive behavior and face no borrowing constraint. It will allow us to
measure the impact of imperfect competition and imperfect capital market
and to introduce some basic assumptions that will be maintained throughout
the paper.
In the competitive economy without borrowing restriction, the marginal
productivities of capital and labor are respectively equal to the gross interest
rate R and the wage wt in period t
F 0K (Kt, Lt) = R and F
0
L (Kt, Lt) = wt
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The competitive capital-labor ratioKt/Lt = kc is the solution of F 0K (k
c, 1) =
R. The equilibrium of the labor market implies
φ0
µ
1− Lt
Nt
¶
= wt = F
0
L (k
c, 1) ≡W c
Let lc = Lt/Nt be the competitive labor supply of each worker, solution of
φ0 (1− lc) = F 0L (kc, 1). It is positive if and only if W c is larger than the
minimum wage Wmin = φ
0 (1).
Assumption 2. W c = F 0L (k
c, 1) > Wmin = φ
0 (1).
The dynamics of wealth of the competitive capitalist i are then
Xit+1 = RXit − Cit
and consumptions satisfy the Euler equation
Cit+1
Cit
= (γR)σ .
As a consequence of Lemma A1 in the appendix, the intertemporal budget
constraint of capitalist i is satisfied with equality (limt−→+∞R−tXit = 0) if
and only if the growth factor of consumption is smaller than the gross interest
rate R. This property is rather intuitive. Indeed, if (γR)σ ≥ R, capitalist
consumption and wealth would grow at a higher rate than his income, which
is unfeasible. The assumption (γR)σ < R is equivalent to
Assumption 3. γ < γ¯ ≡ R 1σ−1.
Assumptions 2 and 3 made in the benchmark case of a competitive econ-
omy will be maintained for analyzing imperfect competition. Under these
assumptions, the properties of the competitive equilibrium can be further
analyzed. It is straightforward to show that wealth evolves according to:
Xit = (γR)
σtXi0 (7)
and consumption is such that:
Cit = (γR)
σtXi0
¡
1− γσRσ−1
¢
9
3 Short run equilibrium
The problem of a capitalist is broken up into a static problem and a dynamic
problem. The former consists in characterizing labor demand and capital
demand in period t of a capitalist, given his current wealth and labor de-
mands of the other firms. The resulting optimal income function of period
t is studied. Then, we analyze the labor market equilibrium and we state
conditions for the borrowing constraints to be binding or not in each period.
3.1 Capital and labor demands of capitalists
In period t, given wealth Xit and labor demand of other firms L−it, capitalist
i maximizes his income Πit subject to the constraint Zit ≤ µXit. We first
treat the case where the borrowing constraint is not binding and state the
condition ensuring that capitalist i will be unconstrained. Then, we will turn
to the binding case.
The borrowing constraint is not binding. The problem of capitalist i
is equivalent to choose capital stock Kit = Xit + Zit and labor Lit, which
maximize
F (Ki, Li)−R (Ki −Xit)−Wt (Li + L−it)Li
with respect to Ki and Li. The solution is independent of Xit. The capital-
labor ratio has the same value as in the competitive economy
Kit
Lit
= kc. (8)
Moreover, optimal labor demand Lit satisfies
Wt (Lit + L−it) +W
0
t (Lit + L−it)Lit =W
c. (9)
Since the LHS in (9) increases fromWt (L−it) to +∞ when Lit increases from
0 to Nt−L−it, there is a unique positive solution Lit = ψt (L−it) of (9) if and
only if Wt (L−it) < W c.
Note that the borrowing constraint is not binding if and only if Zit =
Kit − Xit ≤ µXit at the unconstrained optimum. Since Kit = kcψt (L−it),
this inequality rewrites
Xit ≥
kcψt (L−it)
1 + µ
. (10)
The borrowing constraint is binding. From the above analysis, we
deduce that, if Xit < kcψt (L−it) / (1 + µ), capitalist i cannot reach his un-
constrained optimal income. In this case, labor demand Lit maximizes
F ((1 + µ)Xit, Li)−RµXit −Wt (Li + L−it)Li
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with respect to Li. Since F 0L (1, 0) > F
0
L
¡
1, 1
kc
¢
=W c, the assumption W c >
Wt (L−it) implies that there exists a unique positive solution in Lit of
Wt (Lit + L−it) +W
0
t (Lit + L−it)Lit = F
0
L ((1 + µ)Xit, Lit) (11)
In both cases, the eﬀect of non-competitive behavior appears in equa-
tions (9) and (11) with the term W 0t (Lit + L−it)Lit. It renders the fact that
capitalists take into account the impact of their labor demands on wages.
3.2 Optimal income function of a capitalist
Let us define Π∗it (Xit, L−it) as the maximum profit of capitalist i, that we call
optimal income function of capitalist i. We have stressed that the character-
ization of the optimal factor demands of a capitalist depends on his level of
wealth, but the diﬀerentiability of the optimal income function with respect
to wealth is needed for obtaining the usual Euler equation. We prove this
property in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that L−it satisfies Wt (L−it) < W c. Then, the op-
timal income function Π∗it (Xit, L−it) of capitalist i is continuously dif-
ferentiable with respect to Xit.
(i) If the borrowing constraint is not binding (Xit ≥ kcψt (L−it) / (1 + µ)),
then (∂Π∗it/∂Xit) (Xit, L−it) = R.
(ii) If it is binding (Xit < kcψt (L−it) / (1 + µ)), then (∂Π∗it/∂Xit) (Xit, L−it) =
(1 + µ)F 0K ((1 + µ)Xit, Lit)−Rµ > R.
Proof. The derivatives in (i) and (ii) are respectively obtained for Xit <
kcψt (L−it) / (1 + µ) andXit > k
cψt (L−it) / (1 + µ), by the envelope theorem.
For Xit = kcψt (L−it) / (1 + µ), we have F
0
K ((1 + µ)Xit, Lit) = R, which
implies that, at this point, left-hand derivative and right-hand derivative are
equal. Thus, Π∗it is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to Xit.
Finally, if the borrowing constraint is binding, we have (1 + µ)Xit/Lit <
kc which implies (1 + µ)F 0K ((1 + µ)Xit, Lit)−Rµ > R. This concludes the
proof. ¥
This proposition shows that, when the borrowing constraint is not bind-
ing, the marginal return of wealth of some capitalist remains the same as in
the benchmark competitive case, i.e. equal to R. On the contrary, when the
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borrowing constraint is binding, the return is endogenous. It depends on the
non-competitive levels of the labor demands Lit, and thus, will be aﬀected
by imperfect competition.
The diﬀerentiability of the optimal income function in period t+1 allows
to write the marginal optimality condition for the program of capitalist i
(defined by equations (3) to (6)). The Euler equation of capitalist i is
Cit+1
Cit
=
µ
γ
∂Π∗it+1
∂Xit+1
¶σ
. (12)
3.3 Equilibrium of the labor market
In order to analyze the equilibrium of the labor market in period t, we intro-
duce the following deflated variables
xit =
Xit
Nt
, lit =
Lit
Nt
, and lt =
Lt
Nt
=
IX
i=1
lit.
Using equations (2), the marginal cost of labor of the firm held by capitalist
i, Wt (Lt) +W 0t (Lt)Lit, can be written as a function of aggregate labor per
worker lt and labor demand per worker lit
m (lt, lit) ≡ φ0 (1− lt)− φ00 (1− lt) lit (13)
where m increases with respect to lt and lit.
The borrowing constraint is not binding for capitalist i. Then, using
equation (9), the marginal cost of labor is
m (lt, lit) =W
c (14)
which implies
lit = g (lt) ≡
W c − φ0 (1− lt)
−φ00 (1− lt)
.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the function g is positive and decreasing with
lt.
The borrowing constraint is binding for capitalist i. By equation
(11), labor demand lit satisfies
m (lt, lit)− F 0L ((1 + µ)xit, lit) = 0. (15)
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We study this equation in lit. The LHS is increasing with lit, and goes to
+∞ (since m (lt,+∞) = +∞ and F 0L ((1 + µ)xit,+∞) = F 0L (0, 1) is finite).
When lit goes to zero, we have
m (lt, 0)− F 0L ((1 + µ)xit, 0) < W c − F 0L (1, 0) ,
and the LHS is negative sinceW c < F 0L (1, 0). Thus, there is a unique solution
to equation (15)
lit = h (xit, lt)
where h is increasing with respect to xit and decreasing with respect to lt.
Remark. It is possible to make a comparison with the case where capitalist
i has a competitive behavior and a binding borrowing constraint. In this
case, labor demand lit satisfies:
φ0 (1− lt)− F 0L ((1 + µ)xit, lit) = 0. (16)
This equation has a unique solution that can be written:
lit = H (xit, lt)
where H is increasing with respect to xit and decreasing with respect to lt.
Moreover, for given values of xit and lt, imperfect competition reduces labor
demand : h (xit, lt) < H (xit, lt) .
Characterization of the labor market equilibrium. The condition for
capitalist i to be constrained is (1 + µ)xit/lit < kc, or equivalently
F 0L ((1 + µ) xit, lit) < W
c = F 0L (k
c, 1) .
From equation (14) and (15), we deduce that capitalist i is constrained if
and only if
h (xit, lt) < g (lt) .
Therefore, labor demand of capitalist i can be written as a function λ of
wealth xit and aggregate labor lt,
lit = λ (xit, lt) ≡ min {h (xit, lt) , g (lt)}
where λ is non-decreasing with respect to xit and decreasing with respect to
lt. An equilibrium of the labor market lt is a solution of
lt =
IX
i=1
λ (xit, lt) .
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Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, and given wealths of capitalists
(Xit)i=1,...,I, there is a unique positive equilibrium l
∗
t of the labor market
in period t. Labor per worker l∗t is lower than its competitive level l
c
(without borrowing constraint).
Proof. The LHS of the equilibrium condition lt −
PI
i=1 λ (xit, lt) = 0 is a
continuous increasing function of lt. Its limit when lt goes to 0 is negative,
since both g (0) and h (xit, 0) are positive. Indeed,
g (0) =
W c − φ0 (1)
−φ00 (1) > 0
and h (xit, 0) is such that
φ0 (1)− φ00 (1)h (xit, 0)− F 0L ((1 + µ) xit, h (xit, 0)) = 0.
Moreover, since g (lc) = 0, we have λ (xit, lc) = 0. Thus, when lt goes to
lc, the limit of lt −
PI
i=1 λ (xit, lt) is positive. By consequence, there is a
unique l∗t in the interval (0, l
c) satisfying the equilibrium condition of the
labor market. ¥
At equilibrium of the labor market, labor demand of capitalist i is l∗it =
λ (xit, l
∗
t ). The borrowing constraint of capitalist i is binding if and only if
h (xit, l
∗
t ) < g (l
∗
t ).
3.4 Comparison of competitive and non-competitive
equilibria
What is the impact of capitalists non-competitive behavior on the labor
demand, wages and profits ? To answer this question, we first compare the
resulting equilibrium with the benchmark competitive case where there is
no restriction on borrowing. Then, we analyze how imperfect competition
modifies the equilibrium when the borrowing constraint is binding.
The borrowing constraint is not binding. If all capitalists have enough
wealth to be unconstrained, total labor is L∗t = Ntl
∗ (I), where l∗ (I) is the
solution of l−Ig (l) = 0. In this case, all capitalists employ the same quantity
of labor given by:
Nt
l∗ (I)
I
From the properties of g, we deduce that, if the number of capitalists I
augments, total labor increases and tends to its competitive level Ntlc when
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I goes to infinity. The diﬀerence lc − l∗ (I) is a consequence of the Nash
behavior of capitalists on labor market, and reflects the eﬀect of imperfect
competition.
The optimal income function Π∗it (Xit, L−it) of capitalist i can be written
at equilibrium:
RXit +Nt
l∗ (I)
I
·
−φ00 (1− l∗ (I)) l
∗ (I)
I
¸
The term RXit is the income of the capitalist in the case of a competitive
behavior. The supplementary term, which is positive, corresponds to the
extra rent of the capitalist, due to its non-competitive behavior. Thus, when
the borrowing constraint is not binding, the marginal return of capital is un-
changed by the non-competitive behavior, and the level of profit is increased
by the extra rent due to the non-competitive behavior.
The borrowing constraint is binding for at least one capitalist i.
Then, his labor demand is l∗it = h (xit, l
∗
t ) < g (l
∗
t ) where l
∗
t =
PI
j=1 l
∗
jt <
Ig (l∗t ). Thus, if some capitalist is constrained, equilibrium labor l
∗
t is smaller
than l∗ (I). The diﬀerence l∗ (I)− l∗t is a consequence of an additional eﬀect
that results from the borrowing constraint.
To obtain more precise results about the role of imperfect competition, we
must focus on the special case of a symmetrical equilibrium with a binding
borrowing constraint for all agents.
The symmetrical equilibrium with a binding borrowing constraint.
We assume that xit and l∗it are equal in all firms and we note the common
value of the capital stock xt. In this case, labor demand in each firm is equal
to l∗t /I, with l
∗
t solution to the equation:
l∗t /I = h (xt, l
∗
t )
Let us compare the equilibrium labor demand l∗t with the equilibrium labor
demand obtained when capitalists have a competitive behavior and a binding
borrowing constraint. The latter denoting by l∗ct is solution of:
l∗ct /I = H (xt, l
∗c
t )
It is straightforward to prove that l∗t < l
∗c
t . Indeed, we proceed by contradic-
tion, assuming l∗t > l
∗c
t . Since H is a decreasing function of l and, using the
property that, for all (x, l), h (x, l) < H (x, l), we deduce
l∗t
I
= h (xt, l
∗
t ) < H (xt, l
∗
t ) < H (xt, l
∗c
t ) =
l∗ct
I
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which contradicts the initial statement. Thus, for a given capital stock, we
conclude that the non-competitive behavior of the capitalists results in a
smaller value for equilibrium employment. Indeed, capitalists demand less
labor in order to decrease the level of wages.
The optimal income function Π∗it (Xit, L−it) of capitalist i can be written
at equilibrium:
Xit [(1 + µ)F
0
K ((1 + µ)xt, l
∗
t /I)−Rµ] +Ntl∗t /I [−φ00 (1− l∗t ) l∗t /I]
The return on capital [(1 + µ)F 0K ((1 + µ)xt, l
∗
t /I)−Rµ] appears in the first
term, while the second term consists of the extra rent due to the non-
competitive behavior. If capitalists behave competitively, their optimal profit
becomes
Xit [(1 + µ)F
0
K ((1 + µ)xt, l
∗c
t /I)−Rµ]
and the rent vanishes.
By contrast with the non-binding case, imperfect competition changes
the capital return. When the borrowing constraint is not binding, the cap-
ital return is equal to the international return R, whatever the behavior of
capitalist is (competitive or non-competitive). When the borrowing con-
straint is binding, imperfect competition decreases equilibrium employment
and consequently reduces capital return. Therefore, non-competitive behav-
ior increases the income of capitalists by a rent extracted from workers, but
it decreases the marginal productivity of capital at equilibrium. As we shall
see, this second eﬀect will always result in lower capital accumulation in the
long-run.
4 Long run equilibrium
We prove the existence of two types of long-run balanced growth path. The
first one is associated with the natural growth rate and arises when borrowing
constraints are binding for all capitalists. When capitalists are unconstrained,
consumption and wealth of every capitalist grow at a constant rate driven
by the international gross interest rate. Finally, we study the possibility of
a transition from the constrained regime toward the unconstrained regime.
4.1 Stationary growth path at rate n
Let assume that all variables grow at the same rate as Nt, i.e. ratios
Cit
Nt
= bci, Xit
Nt
= bxi, Lit
Nt
= bli, Π∗it
Nt
= bπi,
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are constant. Along such a path, labor per worker Lt/Nt is also constant and
equal to bl, solution of l −PIi=1 λ (bxi, l) = 0. Consequently, labor demand of
capitalist i is such that bli = λ³bxi,bl´.
From the Euler equation (12), the marginal revenue ∂Π∗it+1/∂Xit+1 must
be constant and equal to (1+n)
1/σ
γ . Furthermore, we know from Proposition 1
that
ρi ≡
∂Π∗it+1
∂Xit+1
=
(
R, if i is not constrained
(1 + µ)F 0K
³
(1 + µ) bxi,bli´−Rµ > R, if i is constrained
(17)
Thus, we have
ρi = ρ ≡
(1 + n)1/σ
γ
≥ R (18)
and this inequality is strict if i is constrained.
Proposition 3. If γ < (1+n)
1/σ
R
≡ γ˜, then there exists a unique stationary
equilibrium growth path at the natural rate. Along this path, all dynas-
ties of capitalists have equal wealth and their borrowing constraints are
binding.
Proof. From (17) and (18), along a stationary growth path, all capital-
labor ratios (1 + µ) xˆi/lˆi are equal to the solution kˆ of
(1 + µ)F 0K (k, 1)−Rµ = ρ > R. (19)
Moreover, the marginal cost of labor m(lˆ, lˆi) is equal to its marginal product
F 0L(kˆ, 1). This implies that all labor demands are equal to lˆ/I. This in turn
leads to the equality of wealth xˆi = kˆ lˆ/ [(1 + µ) I].
Conversely, these variables satisfy all the equilibrium conditions when
all capitalists are constrained. Indeed, from (19), we have F 0K(kˆ, 1) > R =
F 0K (k (R) , 1) and we deduce that (1 + µ) xˆi/lˆi = kˆ < k
c, which implies that
all the borrowing constraints are binding. ¥
We are now in a position to discuss the eﬀect of imperfect competition
on labor and capital income in the long-run when all capitalists are con-
strained on their borrowing. Indeed, the long-run capital-labor ratio kˆ does
not depend on the competition environment. It would be the same in a com-
petitive economy with binding borrowing constraints. In the short run, for
a given level of wealth Xi, we have seen in Section 3.4 that non-competitive
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behavior leads capitalists to reduce their labor demand. The resulting mar-
ginal product of capital is smaller than in the competitive case. Now, in the
long-run, capitalists wealths being endogenous, marginal product of capital
remains unchanged whatever the competition environment is. Consequently,
since labor demand is lower in the non-competitive case, wealth must also
be lower. Imperfect competition leads to lower capital accumulation.
Increasing the number of families I allows to modify the intensity of
competition, an infinite number of families corresponding to perfect compe-
tition. Note that the capital-labor ratio does not depend on I. Total labor
per worker lˆ satisfies m(lˆ, lˆ / I) = F 0L(kˆ, 1) and is increasing with respect
to the number of capitalists I. When I tends to +∞, it converges to lˆ∞
solution of m(lˆ∞, 0) = F 0L(kˆ, 1) < W
c. Since lˆ is increasing with I, total
wealth per worker xˆ =
PI
i=1 xˆi = kˆ lˆ/ (1 + µ) is also increasing with I. As a
consequence, non-competitive behavior of capitalists results in lower capital
accumulation, lower employment and lower income for workers.
Remark. If capitalists cannot borrow (µ = 0) and if the population growth
rate n is zero, the equilibrium capital-labor ratio corresponds to the Modified
Golden-Rule level, solution of γF 0K (k, 1) = R. When n > 0 and µ > 0, two
additional modifications aﬀect the stationary capital-labor ratio. First, along
a stationary growth path, a positive growth rate of worker population leads
to a positive growth rate of the consumption of any capitalist. This augments
long-run marginal return of wealth ρ. Second, with µ > 0, capitalists can
borrow and use higher capital stock than with µ = 0. The capital-labor ratio
kˆ increases with respect to µ.
4.2 Dynamics with unconstrained capitalists
If no capitalist is constrained in period t, then all capital stocks K∗it and labor
demands L∗it are identical among capitalists, and we have L
∗
it = L
∗
t/I = Ntl
∗,
where l∗ = l∗ (I) is the solution of Ig (l)− l = 0. Optimal income of capitalist
i is
Π∗it = F (K∗it, L∗it)−R (K∗it −Xit)−Wt (L∗t )L∗it
= RXit + [W
c −Wt (L∗t )]L∗it
where the second equality is obtained appealing to linear homogeneity of
the production function F and to the equality F 0K (K
∗
i , L
∗
i ) = R, which also
implies F 0L (K
∗
i , L
∗
i ) =W
c. Thus, we can rewrite the optimal income as
Π∗it = RXit + b∗Nt (20)
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where
b∗ = [W c − φ0 (1− l∗)] l
∗
I
.
is the rent per worker of each capitalist. Non competitive behavior allows the
capitalist to levy the rent b∗ on worker income. Diﬀerentiating the aggregate
rent per worker Ib∗ with respect to I leads to
[W c − φ0 (1− l∗) + φ00 (1− l∗) l∗] dl
∗
dI
=
·
φ00 (1− l∗)
µ
l∗ − l
∗
I
¶¸
dl∗
dI
which is negative since l∗ is increasing with I. Therefore, the rent per worker
for each capitalist b∗ is also decreasing with I and tends to zero as I becomes
infinite. As I represents the intensity of competition, stronger competition
tends to diminish the rent.
From equations (12) and (17), we obtain
C∗it+1
C∗it
= (γR)σ ≡ G.
From the budget constraint Π∗it = C∗it +X∗it+1 and (20), we have
X∗it+1 = RX
∗
it + b
∗Nt − C∗it (21)
Dynamics of wealth and consumption of capitalist i are characterized by
the two-dimensional system that consists of these two last equations, where
initial wealth Xi0 is given.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 be satisfied. If
γ ≥ (1 + n)
1/σ
R
≡ γ˜
and
Xi0 ≥
kcN0
1 + µ
, for i = 1, . . . , I,
then there exists a unique growth path where consumption and wealth
of any capitalist asymptotically increase at factor G. Along this path,
no capitalist is constrained. For the given initial wealth Xi0 of family
i, wealth Xit is given by
Xit = Xi0G
t +
b∗N0
R− (1 + n)
£
Gt − (1 + n)t
¤
(22)
and consumption Cit grows at factor G.
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Proof. If no capitalist is constrained, then consumption C∗it of capitalist i
grows at factor G and, from (21), dynamics of his wealth are
X∗it+1 = RX
∗
it + b
∗Nt − Ci0Gt.
Using Lemma A1 in the appendix, there exists a unique solution to this
diﬀerence equation, given by (22). The assumption γ ≥ γ˜ is equivalent to
G ≥ 1 + n. Thus,
Xit ≥ Xi0 (1 + n)t ≥
kcN0
1 + µ
(1 + n)t ≥ k
cψt (L−it)
1 + µ
.
If all capitalists are unconstrained in period 0 and G ≥ 1 + n, then they are
still unconstrained in any future period. ¥
Equation (22) can be compared to (7) obtained in the case of perfect
competition when all capitalists are unconstrained : Xit = Xi0Gt. The extra
rent due to imperfect competition enhances wealth accumulation. In contrast
to the case with binding borrowing constraints, the imperfect competition
provides extra rent without modifying the marginal productivity of capital.
Considering two families i and j with diﬀerent initial wealths, Xi0 > Xj0,
the inequality among capitalists will also hold in the long-run since
lim
t→+∞
Xit
Xjt
=
Xi0 +
b∗N0
R−(1+n)
Xj0 +
b∗N0
R−(1+n)
,
which is larger than 1. But, it is also smaller than Xi0/Xj0 that would be the
limit of the ratio in the competitive case. Since the extra rent is the same for
all capitalists, whatever their wealths, imperfect competition tends to reduce
inequality among capitalists.
4.3 Transition
We have shown that, if γ > γ˜ and if capitalists are not constrained initially,
they accumulate enough wealth in each period for remaining unconstrained
in all future periods. In the long-run, the economy follows a growth path
with an asymptotic growth factor equal to G. Now, even if γ > γ˜, capitalist
could be constrained initially because of insuﬃcient wealth. The following
proposition proves that they will become unconstrained in the long-run.
Proposition 5. If γ > (1 + n)1/σ /R ≡ γ˜, whatever the initial wealth of
capitalists, all capitalists becomes unconstrained.
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Proof. In the constrained case, we have
Cit +Xit+1 = Π∗it = F ((1 + µ)Xit, Lit)−RµXit −Wt (Lt)Lit
Since Xit+1 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ Lit ≤ Nt,
Cit ≤ Cit +Xit+1 ≤ F ((1 + µ)Xit, Lit) ≤ F ((1 + µ)Xit, Nt)
and we deduce that
(1 + n)−tCit ≤ F
¡
(1 + µ) (1 + n)−tXit, N0
¢
.
Now, the condition γ > (1 + n)1/σ /R is equivalent to G > 1+n and implies
lim
t→+∞
(1 + n)−tXit = +∞.
A similar argument applies in the unconstrained case. Indeed, we have
Cit ≤ Cit +Xit+1 = Π∗it < RXit + ω (R)L∗it < RXit + ω (R)Nt
which implies
(1 + n)−tCit < R (1 + n)
−tXit + ω (R)N0
and the result follows from the assumption G > 1 + n.
Thus, at some date, the condition Xit ≥ k(R)Nt1+µ is satisfied, for all i and
all capitalists are unconstrained. ¥
Proposition 3, 4 and 5 show that the long-run growth path depends cru-
cially on the respective values of the natural growth factor 1 + n and the
internationally driven growth rate G = (γR)σ. When 1 + n is higher (lower)
than G, capitalists are constrained (unconstrained) in the long-run. Now, in
the unconstrained case, workers benefit from higher wages and higher employ-
ment in the modern sector. These results suggest an interesting policy issue.
In an economy with 1+n > G, an appropriate economic policy can shift the
economy towards the growth path where capitalists are unconstrained.
To this aim, the government may subsidy bequests and finance such pay-
ments with a lump-sum tax. The budget constraint of a capitalist writes
Cit + (1− τ)Xit+1 = Πit − θt
where τ is the share of the bequests financed by the government through a
lump-sum tax θt. The corresponding Euler equation is
Cit+1
Cit
=
µ
γ
1− τ
∂Π∗it+1
∂Xit+1
¶σ
.
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The condition for capitalists to be unconstrained in the long-run rewritesµ
γR
1− τ
¶σ
> 1 + n.
Thus, the unconstrained regime will be reached if the subsidy rate τ is high
enough.
This result shows that subsidizing capitalists bequests improve the wel-
fare of workers. Nevertheless, this policy may increase inequality among
capitalists since the subsidy is proportional whereas the lump-sum tax is
uniform.
5 Conclusion
We have explored the relationship between imperfect competition and capital
accumulation in a two-sector economy with a borrowing constraint. Non-
competitive behavior of capitalists results in a rent which is extracted from
the workers and lower employment in the modern sector.
In the long-run, the borrowing constraints remain binding if the inter-
nationally driven growth rate is lower than the natural one. In this case,
imperfect competition decreases capital accumulation and is detrimental for
growth. In the converse case, the borrowing constraint is not binding and
imperfect competition is beneficial for capital accumulation and growth.
Finally, subsidy on bequests, that incites capitalists to accumulate wealth,
allows the economy to take oﬀ and reach the unconstrained regime. Since em-
ployment and wages are higher in this case, such a policy is welfare-enhancing
for workers.
6 Appendix : Equilibrium without borrow-
ing constraint
If all capitalists are unconstrained, dynamics of consumptions and wealths
are such that
Xit+1 = RXit + bNt − Cit
Cit+1/Cit = (γR)
σ ≡ G
where Xi0 is given. We are looking for initial consumption level Ci0 such that
the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied with equality
lim
t−→+∞
R−tXit = 0.
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Lemma A1. Assume R > N > 0, B > 0 and G > 0. For a given X0, there
exist C0 > 0 such that the diﬀerence equation
Xt+1 = RXt +BN
t − C0Gt (23)
has a solution which satisfies limt−→+∞R−tXt = 0 if and only if G <
R. This value of C0 is unique and equal to
C0 = (R−G)
µ
X0 +
B
R−N
¶
.
Proof. We distinguish three cases depending on the sign of R−G.
• G > R. The general solution of (23) is written as
Xt = λ1R
t + λ2N
t + λ3G
t (24)
where λ1, λ2 and λ3 have to be determined. The intertemporal budget
constraint limt−→+∞R−tXt = 0 implies λ1 = λ3 = 0. Thus Xt = X0N t.
Substituting in (23), one obtains
C0
µ
G
N
¶t
= (R−N)X0 +B
which contradicts C0 > 0. The growth rate of consumption cannot be
higher than the interest rate.
• G = R. The general solution of (23) is written
Xt = (λ0t+ λ1)R
t + λ2N
t
and the intertemporal budget constraint implies λ0 = λ1 = 0. Substi-
tutingXt = X0N t in (23), one still obtains thanG = R is not consistent
with C0 > 0.
• G < R. The general solution of (23) is given by (24). The intertem-
poral budget constraint implies λ1 = 0 and Xt = λ2N t + λ3Gt. By
substitution in (23), we obtain
λ2N
t+1 + λ3G
t+1 = R
¡
λ2N
t + λ3G
t
¢
+BN t − C0Gt.
For N 6= G, we deduce that λ2 = −B/ (R−N) and λ3 = C0/ (R−G).
Since X0 = λ2 + λ3, we have
C0 = (R−G)
·
X0 +
B
R−N
¸
.
The same formula applies in the case N = G.¥
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Under the assumption G < R (assumption 3 in the text), the unique
solution of (23) writes
Xt = X0G
t +
B
R−N
¡
Gt −N t
¢
24
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